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Demise of American Indian Ranching on the
Northern Great Plains
Raymond Cross
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Understanding the Distinctive Socio-Legal Character of "Indian
Ranching"
Indian ranching arose on the northern Great Plains,1 in the late
nineteenth century, due to two seemingly unrelated factors that later
combined to make possible its establishment in that region of Indian
Country. The first factor, bio-social in character, was the early Euro-
pean settlers' introduction into North America of two exotic beasts, the
horse and the cow, in the early seventeenth century. The second factor,
socio-legal in character, was the federal government's overbearing "In-
dian civilizing" policy, during the Indian allotment era of the late nine-
teenth century, which required the Indian peoples of the northern Great
Plains to adapt quickly to a settled and sedentary agriculturally-based
way of life. These Indian peoples were expected to use their federally
assigned, small individual land parcels-known as Indian allotments-as
the basis for commencing their new farming-based way of life.2
* Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law.
1. Historian Walter Webb defines the Great Plains to include:
[Tlhe region west of the Mississippi River, the region under consideration here, these three
characteristics of a plains environment are not coextensive or coterminal. The three are
not found in conjunction except in a portion of what is commonly called the Central Great
Plains; that is, in the High Plains, or the Plains proper. In the High Plains the land is rela-
tively level and unscored, it is barren of timber, and the climate is sub-humid, semi-arid, or
arid. The High Plains constitute the heart of what may be called the Great Plains, and ex-
emplify to the highest degree the features of plane surface, a treeless region, and a sub-
humid one.
WALTER PREScoTt WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS 4 (1936).
2. Professor Peter Iverson describes the impact of Indian allotment on the northern Great
Plains as follows:
Thus, allotment occurred in the northern Plains more fully than in any other location. Yet
even there the reduction of the Indian estate proved incomplete. Even if they held land in
divided form, tribal members still controlled significant acreages. Nonetheless, the allot-
ment put individual Indians in an untenable position. They did not have enough land to
farm or raise livestock in a manner that permitted self-sufficiency. Inheritance only com-
plicated an already unhealthy scenario. Denying the virtue of primogeniture, Native fami-
HeinOnline  -- 49 Washburn L.J. 745 2009-2010
Washburn Law Journal
But Indian ranching-not subsistence-level farming-ultimately
triumphed as the federally sponsored means whereby some measure of
civilization could be imposed on the Indian peoples of that region. This
Article evaluates the phenomenon of Indian ranching from its rise in the
late nineteenth century to its potential demise in the early years of the
twenty-first century. Many intertwined factors-political, economic,
cultural, ecological, and spiritual-account for Indian ranching's rise, as
well as its impending demise.
My overarching thesis is that Indian ranching could well have be-
come the Indian-civilizing strategy that helped bridge the vast socio-
economic gulf that existed, and still exists, between the Indian and non-
Indian peoples of the northern Great Plains. Its impending demise is
the direct result of significant policy-based mistakes made by the rele-
vant decision makers-both Indian and non-Indian-at critical deci-
sional junctures in the mid-to-late twentieth century. Its impending de-
mise is also the indirect result of those inherent and long-standing
cultural and social differences between Indian and non-Indian ranching
societies on the northern Great Plains. However, and surprisingly per-
haps, I conclude that its impending demise can today be avoided if the
federal government and the Indian leadership could work together in
crafting an effective legislatively driven settlement of two major pending
Indian lawsuits. 3 Such a settlement, designed perhaps with some of the
ameliorative elements I will later suggest, could go some distance to-
ward restoring Indian ranching to economic and social viability on the
northern Great Plains.4
B. Analysis of the Socio-Legal Factors That Have Influenced American
Indian Ranching
Some commentators have regarded Indian ranching as just another
failed Indian assimilation initiative undertaken by the federal govern-
ment in the late nineteenth century. My first goal is to challenge di-
rectly the notion that Indian ranching was a fundamentally flawed and
failed Indian-civilizing initiative that should now be abandoned. My
second goal is to argue that Indian ranching was, and is, likely the only
way that Indian people can derive direct and significant economic and
cultural benefits from the use of their lands on the northern Great
lies tended to divide meager portions into still smaller, even less adequate ones. Such divi-
sion discouraged the very agrarian initiative the idealist who supported the Dawes Act had
hoped to foster.
PETER IVERSON, WHEN INDIANS BECAME COWBOYS: NATIVE PEOPLES AND CATTLE RANCHING IN
THE AMERICAN WEST 30-31 (1994).
3. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'dsub nom. Cobell v. Norton, 240
F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Keepseagle v. Venneman, No. Civ.A.9903119EGS1712, 2001 WL
34676944 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2001).
4. See infra Part II.E.2 (The Major Elements of My Proposal).
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Plains. I further argue that those same socio-legal factors that justified
the rise of Indian ranching in the late nineteenth century also justify its
legislative restoration in the early twenty-first century. These socio-
legal factors are political, environmental, and socio-cultural.
1. The Political Factor
Indian ranching, according to some commentators, was the by-
product of the federal government's effort, during the Indian allotment
era, to transform the ostensibly nomadic Indian peoples of the northern
Great Plains into subsistence-level farmers on their federally assigned
small land parcels, known as Indian allotments.5 From this perspective,
the Indian people had little say in whether they would become either
ranchers or farmers; instead, that outcome would be determined by
which civilizing option was chosen for them by the relevant federal au-
thorities. These commentators contend that Indian ranching became
the dominant Indian-civilizing strategy on the northern Great Plains be-
cause the local Indian agents-based on their personal experience with,
and knowledge of, the climate and terrain of the northern Great
Plains- concluded that it was the only development strategy that could
possibly work within this environment.6 Furthermore, it was these In-
dian agents who convinced their bosses in Washington, D.C., that ranch-
ing, not farming, was the only assimilative strategy that could be success-
fully imposed on the Indian peoples within that region of Indian
Country.7
5. Professor Getches argues that "[wiell-intentioned reformers [via the allotment process]
sought to transform Indians and their cultures according to Jeffersonian values of yeoman husbandry
[disregarding the fact that] Indian cultural traditions, experiences, and sentiment were often opposed
to a sedentary, individualized lifestyle." DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 142 (5th ed. 2005) (alterations added). These reformers, ac-
cording to Getches, also ignored the fact that the Indians' "small plots in arid lands were inadequate
to provide Indians subsistence." Id.
6. Professor Iverson contends that Indian agents realized early on that the Indians' lands were
generally far better suited to ranching than to agricultural use. Despite the resistance from their
bosses in Washington, D.C., Iverson argues that:
Nonetheless ... government personnel attempted to foster the cattle industry among the
Cheyennes and Arapahos on their reservation in the southwestern portion of Indian terri-
tory. They did so for the reasons the attempt was made to the north: the land was better
suited for ranching than for farming, and the [Indian] men were far more interested in cat-
tle than corn.
IVERSON, supra note 2, at 88. However, the judgment of these Indian agents "ran counter to the pre-
vailing wisdom in Washington that preached corn rather than cattle; the agent[s] and the Indians re-
ceived precious little help in the promotion of ranching." Id. at 89.
7. However, Professor Iverson emphasizes that these federal efforts merely complemented the
Indian ranching phenomenon that was already at work on the plains:
Thus, in the early nineteenth century it can be argued convincingly that livestock "did not
just enter the lands of the Choctaw; it entered their culture as well and made pastoralists of
many who had been hunters." Beef and cattle entered into ceremonies and special occa-
sions such as the birth of a child. They thus began to matter not only as a means of eco-
nomic exchange but also as a means to feed one's family. They began to become an essen-
tial, natural, integral part of events. They helped facilitate the gatherings that brought
meaning to the rituals that symbolized important life events. In this manner, the Choctaws
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This Article, by contrast, contends it was the Indian peoples' active
and conscious decision to embrace Indian ranching that made it the
right strategy for the development of successful Indian agricultural en-
terprises on the northern Great Plains. My emphasis on the Indian peo-
ples' choice to embrace Indian ranching, thus, both completes and cor-
rects what had been somewhat incomplete and one-sided accounts that
overly emphasized the federal government's role in giving birth to In-
dian ranching. My account not only explains why Indian ranching came
into being, it also explains why it became the dominant and enduring
form of agricultural enterprise on the northern Great Plains. In sum, I
conclude that Indian ranching arose, endured, and succeeded because it
served the joint interests of both the federal government and the af-
fected Indian peoples.8
2. The Environmental Factor
My account also downplays the role played by those environmental
factors-such as the assuredly harsh and limiting climate and prairie
ecology of the northern high plains -that arguably compelled the choice
of Indian ranching as the only practicable economic development strat-
egy for this region of Indian Country. Doubtless, the relative aridity of
the northern high plains, combined with its meter-thick sod that had
broken many a farmer's plow, helped persuade even resolute opponents
of Indian ranching that, at least on the northern high plains, it was the
only possible Indian-civilizing strategy that could be effectively imple-
mented. However, the past emphasis on these environmental factors
mistakes a mere condition, the well-known physical and climatic charac-
teristics of this region, for the cause of Indian ranching's rise on the
northern Great Plains. I argue that it was the Indian peoples' active
choice to embrace ranching, while giving due consideration to the envi-
ronmental conditions of the northern high plains, that most fully ex-
anticipated the kind of role that cattle would soon play elsewhere in the West. Again, one
sees the significance of cattle in more than economic terms.
Id. at 19.
8. Professor Iverson explains the appeal of ranching to the Indian peoples in this manner:
The raising of cattle became at this time an appropriate economic strategy, given the kind
of land the Indians possessed and the kind of world in which they had lived. The love of
the outdoors, of horses, and of movement all contributed to the positive chord struck by the
new industry. But cattle ranching must be understood in a social as well as an economic
context. By becoming an owner of a considerable number of cattle, a person could achieve
status within the community, Moreover, this individual could use the animals themselves to
obtain the kind of reputation generally sought. By giving cattle or beef to one's relatives,
by feeding people at a celebration, and in other comparable ways, a person would be seen
as generous, thoughtful, and properly mindful of the well-being of others. By becoming or
continuing to be a skilled rider, one demonstrated a skill appreciated and noted. By raising
cattle of good quality, one showed that Indians could participate on an equal or competitive
basis in a pastime that dominated the surrounding non-Indian society.
Id. at 53-54.
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plains the phenomenon of Indian ranching.
9
3. The Socio-Cultural Factor
There is no deep mystery as to why the Indian peoples chose ranch-
ing as their preferred means of assimilating, more or less, to a non-
Indian way of life. Only Indian ranching offered them the opportunity
to retain significant elements of their beloved horse culture that they
had earlier embraced with gusto. While it is unlikely that they em-
braced ranching with equal gusto, they nonetheless realized that ranch-
ing, not farming, would allow them to retain the horse as a central fix-
ture of their new way of life.
10
Of course, their well documented bias in favor of ranching, and
against farming, did not blind them to those environmental realities that
rendered subsistence-level farming impracticable, especially on their
relatively small, individually owned allotments. Subsistence-level farm-
ing, whether on small land parcels called homesteads or on Indian al-
lotments, was likely doomed to fail given the environmental conditions
of the northern high plains. Indeed, there was at least one non-Indian
who shared the Indians' view point in this regard-the fabled western
adventurer and one-armed veteran of the Civil War, Major John Wesley
Powell. He inveighed, as the head of the newly formed United States
Geological Survey, against the extension of the homesteading program
to those public lands west of the 100th meridian. Like the Indians, he
knew that subdividing those western lands into under-sized, subsistence-
level land parcels, would soon lead to the ecosystem-wide disruption of
the natural systems of this region. He also knew that those who were
naive would be homesteaders-who foolishly heeded the western
boosters' scientifically unsubstantiated boast that "the rain followed the
9. Historian Webb describes the rise of the nineteenth century "cattle kingdom" as a natural
response to the environmental realities of the northern Great Plains:
In this chapter an attempt will be made to show the setting for the cattle kingdom, to
explain how it arose naturally out of conditions peculiar to the setting, and, if possible, to
make clear that the ways of cattlemen, cowboys, and horses in the Great Plains were as
logical both in their existence and in their actions as those of bankers, clerks, and steam-
boats in another environment.
WEBB, supra note 1, at 206-07.
10. Walter Prescott Webb extols the transformative influence of the horse on the Plains Indians
culture:
A study of the influence of the horse on the Plains Indians brings us to the threshold of
history. Some of the effects may be cited. In general, it is maintained that the horse did not
introduce new qualities into Plains culture. The true Plains Indians already possessed the
traits that they continued to exhibit. They were nomadic, nonagricultural, warlike people
who depended primarily on the buffalo herds for sustenance. What the horse did was to in-
tensify these traits. The Indians of the Plains became more nomadic (that is, they ranged
farther), less inclined to agriculture, more warlike, and far better buffalo hunters than they
had been before. It was this intensification of the traits they already possessed that became
important in the history of the relation of the Indians to the white man. The horse ushered
in the golden era of the Plains Indians.
Id. at 58.
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plow"-and would harvest only heartbreak on their small, uneconomic
homesteads on the northern high plains. But Powell, given his outspo-
ken advocacy against the extension of the homestead policy west of the
100th meridian, provoked congressional ire and was soon removed from
office and banished to obscurity."
C Why Indian Ranching Succeeded in the Late Nineteenth Century
but Faced Impending Failure in the Mid-to-Late Twentieth Century
Both Indian ranching's early success and its impending demise may
be explained by analyzing those socio-legal factors mentioned earlier. A
more comprehensive and thorough understanding of that complex phe-
nomenon known as Indian ranching may aid today's non-Indian and In-
dian policy makers to deal better with its potential demise in the early
decades of the twenty-first century.
1. The Socio-Economic Explanation of Indian Ranching's Early Success
Indian ranching succeeded because it was the only practicable
means whereby the jointly held interests of the federal government and
the Indian peoples could be realized. The federal Indian policy makers
"bought into" Indian ranching because it was the only means whereby
some measure of assimilation would be achieved by the affected Indian
peoples. The Indian peoples bought into Indian ranching because it was
their only adaptive strategy whereby they could preserve important
elements of their fabled horse culture.
Indian ranching in its early days, given the uneasy relationship be-
tween the overbearing Indian agents and their sometimes recalcitrant
Indian wards, experienced serious "growing pains." The new would-be
Indian ranchers had to learn quickly all those ranching skills-cattle
breeding, livestock herding, cattle branding, and livestock marketing-
that non-Indian ranchers had acquired incrementally over several gen-
erations within nurturing ranching families and family-owned livestock
11. Professor Robert Keiter notes Powell's opposition to the federal government's extension of
the Homestead Act, as well as other federal land disposal laws into the semi-arid West:
Congress, using laws like the Homestead Act of 1862, the Desert Lands Act of 1877, and
the General Mining Law of 1872, sought to attract prospective settlers and entrepreneurs to
the western frontier with the enticement of virtually free land and minerals. The new states
followed suit, employing a similar disposal technique to administer the region's scarce wa-
ter resources. Even without acquiring actual title, the early settlers enjoyed largely unre-
stricted access to the region's abundant public timber, grass, and wildlife, usually without
any charge or oversight. To be sure, the legendary explorer John Wesley Powell and a few
other astute observers cautioned early on that the region's unusually dry climate and arid
landscape were ill-suited to traditional agricultural practices. But the boosters ignored
these warnings and wholeheartedly embraced the disposal policies that had worked so well
farther eastward.
ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE: ECOSYSTEMS, DEMOCRACY, & AMERICA'S
PUBLIC LANDS 17 (2003).
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businesses. Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) agricultural-
related education and financing initiatives, especially in Indian ranch-
ing's early days, fell woefully short of the Indians' needs, Indian ranch-
ing, nonetheless, somehow survived and many Indian-ranching families
soon became established on the northern Great Plains.12
2. The Socio-Economic Explanation of Indian Ranching's Threatened
Demise in the Later Twentieth Century
Although Indian ranching overcame virtually all of its initial finan-
cial and managerial hurdles that had threatened to derail it in the early
twentieth century, it faced new threats and challenges during the mid-to-
late twentieth century. But these threats derived primarily from the
misguided and short-sighted federal Indian policies of that era. For ex-
ample, Indian Commissioner John C. Collier's arbitrary judgment, dur-
ing the "Indian New Deal" era of the 1930s, that Indian ranchers would
never be capable of more than subsistence-level ranching, effectively de-
terred Indian ranchers from seeking to expand and improve their ranch-
ing operations. His arbitrary policy judgment left the Indian ranchers ill
equipped to compete within those radically changed socio-economic cir-
cumstances of the later twentieth century that favored large, commer-
cial-level ranching operations over the Indians' historic subsistence-level
ranching operations. Collier's ranching policies meant that Indian
ranchers were later unable to take full advantage of these newly devised
modern ranching procedures, technologies, financing strategies, and
managerial approaches. By contrast, those ranching enterprises, usually
non-Indian owned, that successfully transitioned to commercial-level
ranching operations were, thus, enabled to acquire more capital, more
high-quality land, and more livestock. 13
12. Professor Hurt, speaking more directly to the federal government's inadequate efforts to
transform the Indian peoples into farmers, not ranchers, criticized the government's inadequate ef-
forts to aid the Indians in their transition from so-called nomads to farmers:
In the final analysis, governmental aid and education were inadequate, and not enough
time had passed by the late 1880s for the nonagricultural tribes to undergo the cultural
change necessary to enable the Indians to become farmers. . . . [T]he federal government
was expecting the Indians to become self-sufficient and, ultimately, commercial farmers.
Semiarid and arid climates, tough prairie/plains sod, bitter winters, grasshoppers, and other
obstacles presented too great a challenge for the Indians who did not have an agricultural
tradition. Indian culture could not yet triumph over the environment in regard to modem
farming.
R. DOUGLAS HURT, INDIAN AGRICULTURE IN AMERICA: PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT 134-35
(1987).
13. Professor Hurt criticizes Congress's failure to fund adequately Collier's ambitious tribal
land reacquisition program that he had promised the Indians under his Indian New Deal:
Congress's failure to provide funds for a significant land-acquisition program was a ma-
jor flaw in the Indian New Deal, and it prevented any possibility of making either subsis-
tence or commercial farmers out of the tribesmen.... This failure stemmed largely from
the opposition of western congressmen, who resisted the bureau's efforts to purchase the
land of white farmers.... Nor did Collier pursue the matter of land acquisitions with the
diligence needed to solve the problem because of the expense and administrative time re-
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3. The Socio-Legal Analysis of the Limits of Judicial "Activism" in
Solving the Indian-Ranching Crisis
The fate of Indian ranching today is discussed and debated, not
within the BIA or at scholarly conferences called for that purpose, but
within the confines of those lawsuits brought by Indian ranchers who al-
lege that the federal government has systemically failed to provide them
with the necessary financial and technical assistance to enable them to
compete in the new ranching economy of the northern Great Plains.
But what today's Indian ranchers desperately want is an effective finan-
cial and managerial platform whereby at least some, but hopefully
many, of their ranching operations-configured presently as small-scale,
low-capitalized, family-owned and managed enterprises -could be
transformed into commercial-sized, efficiently managed business enter-
prises. Therefore, I propose, what I believe is, a realistic and practicable
legislative framework for the settlement of these Indian lawsuits against
the federal government. The overall purpose of my proposal will be to
muster sufficient land, capital, and managerial skill for the restoration of
some, and hopefully many, Indian-ranching enterprises to long-term
health and economic viability on the northern Great Plains.
14
II. ANSWERING THE KEY QUESTIONS AS TO How INDIAN RANCHING
CAN BE RESTORED TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL VIABILITY ON THE
NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS
My working assumption is that Indian ranching may yet be restored
to economic and social viability on the northern Great Plains. For that
reason, my Article strives to develop an adequate understanding of this
phenomenon: what created it, what sustained it, and why it now faces
impending failure. My goal is to explain this phenomenon to today's
federal and Indian policy makers so that they may act in a reasonable
and expedient manner to restore Indian ranching to social and economic
viability on the northern Great Plains. Several significant questions, if
they are adequately answered, may yield some policy-making insights
into how this goal may be realistically accomplished in light of past his-
tory and experience. These questions are:
1. Why did the Indian peoples of the northern Great Plains so willingly
embrace the Indian-ranching way of life and succeed in incorporating
those two exotic beasts-the horse and the cow-so seamlessly into their
existing societies and economies?
2. Why did the federal government and the Indian peoples seemingly join
forces, in the late nineteenth century, to adopt Indian ranching as the al-
quired. As a result, white-owned land continued to checkerboard the reservations.
Id. at 193.
14. See infra Part II.E.2 (The Major Elements of My Proposal).
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ternative, but appropriate, Indian-civilizing policy on the northern Great
Plains?
3. How, and to what extent, did Indian ranching succeed as a non-Indian
acculturating mechanism that altered the traditional values and beliefs of
the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara people of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation?
4. What policy misjudgments-by the federal policy-makers and the In-
dian peoples-undermined the future of Indian ranching during the "In-
dian New Deal" era of the 1930s and the so-called "termination" era of
the 1950s?
5. What are the conceptual elements of a proposed legislative framework
that will adequately settle two pending Indian lawsuits against the federal
government and serve to restore Indian ranching to economic and social
viability on the northern Great Plains?
A. Answering Ouestion Number One: What Were the Socio-Cultural
Rationales for the American Indian Peoples'Distinctive Attitudes
Toward the Horse and the Cow?
The American Indian peoples held fundamentally different atti-
tudes toward both the horse and the cow than those held by their non-
Indian livestock-raising counterparts. Furthermore, they held different
attitudes toward the horse, on the one hand, and the cow, on the other.
1. The American Indian Peoples' Attitude Toward the Horse
The Indian peoples, particularly those of the northern Great Plains,
viewed that new creature, the horse, from a fundamentally different
value-based perspective than did their non-Indian, horse-raising coun-
terparts. This is because the horse came to these Indian peoples, not
from the early Spanish settlers of the American Southwest, as is asserted
by some non-Indian historians, but from those "holy beings" who have
always served to protect and guide their Indian peoples. These holy be-
ings took pity upon their Indian peoples' longing for this fabulous crea-
ture-the horse-and, therefore, brought it into their lives and cul-
tures.
15
15. Professor Iverson tells the lyrical Indian tale of how the horse came to the Navajos:
The Navajos (Din6) told instead the story of the two boys and coming of the horses.
After the boys had learned the necessary ceremonial chants, the White Bead Woman said,
"The Din6 shall have horses." She sang:
From the East comes a big black mare.
Changed into a maiden.
She comes to me.
From the South comes a blue mare.
Changed into a maiden.
She comes to me.
From the West comes a sorrel mare.
Changed into a maiden.
She comes to me.
From the North comes a white mare.
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Given that the horse's arrival in Indian Country was a divine act of
grace, the Indian peoples were understandably obligated to accord it a
place of honor and esteem within their tribal societies. Perhaps no-
where else in Indian Country was the horse's impact felt as dramatically
as among the Indian peoples of the northern Great Plains. The horse
made possible the rise of those fabled buffalo-hunting tribal cultures
that rose to dominance on the Great Plains during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.16
But non-Indians, with some exceptions, viewed the horse as pre-
dominantly a "beast of burden" that should be, when its useful eco-
nomic life is at an end, disposed of as quickly and efficiently as possible.
According to non-Indian historians, the Indians first obtained the horse,
either by raiding from or trading with early Spanish settlers of the
American Southwest, sometime during the early seventeenth century.
17
But even they concede that the Indian peoples accorded the horse a
much different, if not higher, social function than that accorded the
horse by non-Indian livestock owners. Indeed, some commentators as-
sert that the horse's arrival wrought profound change -economic, so-
cial, and spiritual-in the lives of the Indian peoples, particularly those
of the northern Great Plains. 18 The fabled mounted Indian warrior, for
example, is depicted as a centaur-like being, half-horse and half-man,
Changed into a maiden.
She comes to me.
After White Bead Woman's chanting, four stone fetishes became transformed into liv-
ing horses.
IVERSON, supra note 2, at 9-10 (footnote omitted).
16. Professor Webb describes the horse's significance within the Plains Indians' cultures:
Then came the horse; and overnight, so to speak, the whole life and economy of the Plains
Indians was changed. Steam and electricity have not wrought a greater revolution in the
ways of civilized life than the horse did in the savage life of the Plains. So important was
the horse in the Plains culture that the anthropologists have named the period extending
from 1540 to 1880 the horse-culture period.... It was the horse and the buffalo, but pri-
marily the horse, that enabled them to hold out; without the horse they would have been
easily disposed of, but in possession of this animal they were both uncontrollable and for-
midable.
WEBB, supra note 1, at 53 (footnotes omitted).
17. Professor Iverson, like other non-Indian historians, assumes the Indian peoples of the
American Southwest somehow "acquired" horses from the early Spanish settlers of that region:
The utility for both cattle and horses naturally could be observed by local Indian communi-
ties. At some point in the early 1600s, tribes of northern New Spain such as the Apaches
and the Comanches began to acquire horses. Although it would be later in the 1600s that
other Indian groups in the southwestern United States became more acquainted with the
possibilities of raising cattle, the horse transformed immediately the potential of these small
Indian populations. In war and in peace, they never would be the same. Horses quickly
became objects to be stolen, traded for, fought over, dreamed about.
IVERSON, supra note 2, at 9.
18. Professor Iverson candidly acknowledges the transcendent significance of the horse to the
cultural reformation of tribal identities throughout America:
Over time and in due course, the horse became integral to tribal identity. [The livestock
were] [w]rapped in the strands of people's stories and ceremonies, it eventually became im-
possible to imagine the people themselves without livestock. Thus the Navajos and other
southwestern Indian groups eventually gave thanks not to the Spaniards for introducing the
horse or the sheep but to their own holy beings.
[Vol. 49
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whose ascendance enabled his tribal people to contest for, and hopefully
control, a much larger tribal territory.1
9
2. The American Indian Peoples' Attitude Toward the Cow
The cow was not as enthusiastically welcomed by the Indian peo-
ples as was the horse, not even among the so-called "civilized" eastern
Indian peoples. The Cherokees, for example, regarded the cow as a pest
or nuisance. This was because the English colonists allowed the cow, as
well as their other domesticated livestock, to roam at will, thereby tram-
pling those Indians' large and flourishing gardens. It was some time be-
fore the Cherokees, as well as other eastern Indian peoples, would heed
the urgings of President Jefferson and other non-Indians, to engage in
livestock raising as their means of successfully adapting to the non-
Indian way of living.20  Indeed, the cow, even among the Indian-
ranching tribes, has never been valued in the same economically focused
manner as it was by the non-Indian ranching cultures. For example, the
cow was viewed, particularly by those Indian-ranching tribes of the later
nineteenth-century Southwest, as a sort of "cash reserve" on the hoof,
meaning that the cow was a relatively liquid asset that could be readily
exchanged by its Indian owner for emergency cash when such was re-
quired by family circumstances. Alternatively, these Indian peoples
viewed the cow as a "feast waiting to happen," meaning that the cow's
owner could quickly slaughter it so as to fulfill his cultural obligation to
provide a "good feed" at one of the many Indian celebrations or funeral
events.
21
3. The Socio-Cultural Appeal of Indian Ranching as a Contemporary
Adaptive Strategy
Why, given the Indian peoples' seemingly fundamentally discrep-
ant views regarding the appropriate cultural and social functions of both
the horse and the cow, was Indian ranching ever able to take root as a
driving and enduring socio-economic force among the Indian peoples of
19. Historian Webb describes how the horse's arrival revolutionized Plains Indian warfare:
The horse fitted in perfectly with the Plains Indian's scheme of life, with his penchant
for war, and his care for his own safety. The Indian's conception of valor and bravery dif-
fered from that of the white man. The Indian made war for the purpose of destroying his
enemy and preserving himself.... The horse fitted into this complex, made the Indian
bolder in advance, faster in pursuit, and fleet as the wind in retreat.
WEBB, supra note 1, at 61.
20. Professor Iverson asserts that "Indians saw cattle as other than problematic." IVERSON,
supra note 2, at 16. That is because the "Indian farmers frequently had to contend with English cattle
determined to feast on their crops, trampling vegetables they did not actually consume." Id. at 16-17.
But George Washington and others "urged the Cherokees in 1796 to continue to increase their num-
bers of cattle and hogs." Id. at 17.
21. Professor Iverson asserts that the "Hidatsas did not want to make big profits from their
herds. They liked being able to kill a cow and share the meat with their friends." Id. at 82.
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the northern Great Plains? There is a two-fold rationale for the rise and
success of the Indian-ranching phenomenon during the late nineteenth
century on the northern Great Plains. The first rationale asserts that
Indian ranching gave those Indian peoples a culturally and economically
palatable option as their chosen means of conforming, more or less, to
the federal government's demand that they quickly become a successful
agriculturally based people. Indian ranching, viewed from the Indian
peoples' perspective, offered them an opportunity to preserve a large
part of their beloved horse culture. Of course, they had to accept the
cow along with the horse as part of their civilizing bargain with the fed-
eral government. The Indian peoples' adaptation to ranching was a
daunting task. They were required to learn quickly many technical and
managerial skills such as livestock breeding, cattle herding, cattle feed-
ing, cattle branding, cattle round-ups, as well as the business end of get-
ting their saleable cattle to market at a fair price.22
The second rationale, quite different from the first, asserts that the
rise of Indian ranching among the Indian peoples of the northern Great
Plains is neither a surprising nor startling cultural phenomenon. Indian
ranching is merely the most recent adaptation, by historically, culturally,
and socially resilient tribal peoples, of new material resources into their
pre-existing tribal societies on the northern Great Plains. Both the
horse and the cow, therefore, are simply evidence of the age-old capabil-
ity of these Indian peoples to incorporate and transform newly acquired
materials, even a magical creature like the horse and a useful critter like
the cow, into valued items within their pre-existing cultural and social
framework. Indian ranching allowed them to continue their historic
horse-centered cultures, while also incorporating the cow into a new ma-
terial role and function within their tribal societies.23
Of course, well-acknowledged environmental factors-the arid cli-
mate and the predominantly grassland ecology of the northern Great
Plains-likely played an important role in the rise of Indian ranching in
this region of Indian Country. But these objective factors merely dove-
tailed with the Indian peoples' dominant cultural preference in favor of
Indian ranching. This dominant cultural preference operated in concert
with the federal government's eventual endorsement of ranching as the
means of placing those Indian peoples upon the "white man's road to
22. Indian ranchers progressed quite rapidly as Professor Hurt reports:
In 1920, 40,962 Indians produced $11.9 million of agricultural products, and 44,847 Indians
raised livestock valued at $33.1 million.... The [Indian] stockmen at the Fort Berthold
Reservation in North Dakota shipped hogs weekly to St. Paul and made periodic sales of
steers to Chicago through their cooperative shipping association. By the summer of 1924,
they, too, were using purebred Herefords to improve the tribal herd.
HURT, supra note 12, at 165-66.
23. Professor Iverson argues that "[i]n the nineteenth century, Indian cattle ranching fully
emerged as a strategy to confront changing times. It became part of the tradition of many western
Indian communities." IVERSON, supra note 2, at 14.
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civilization. ,
24
4. The Socio-Cultural Losses Associated with the Rise of Indian
Ranching
It should be remembered that the horse's arrival in Indian Country,
as well as the rise of Indian ranching, did cause some significant cultural
and social dislocation within the existing tribal societies of the northern
Great Plains. Before the horse's arrival, Indian women had been, par-
ticularly within those agricultural tribes of this region, the primary food
producers within their respective tribal societies. After the horse's arri-
val, the balance of cultural and social power shifted significantly in favor
of those Indian men who successfully seized on the horse as an inde-
pendent and personal source of new power and prestige within those
tribal societies. For that reason, one should not think that the horse's
arrival, or the rise of Indian ranching, did not impose significant social
and cultural costs on major segments of these tribal societies.25 This is-
sue will be addressed in more detail in my case-study treatment of In-
dian-ranching's impact on the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation of
the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.26
B. Answering Ouestion Number Two: What Were the Socio-Political
Rationales for Significant Policy Misjudgments Affecting Indian
Ranching During the "Indian New Deal"Era ?
Indian ranching, during the "Indian New Deal" era of the 1930s,
was finally given some of the federal policy attention for which it had
cried out for so long. This new Indian policy-the brainchild of the new
Indian Commissioner, Collier-was intended to reverse and remedy
those accumulated allotment-era problems. These long-standing prob-
lems included the on-going fractionalization of individually owned allot-
24. Professor Iverson cites the federal government's reluctant acceptance of the Mandan and
Hidatsa Indians' preference for ranching over farming on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation:
"Their remaining lands were better for ranching than farming, even if the peoples historically had
been skilled farmers in the short growing seasons of this northern region. The government officials
had pushed agriculture; the people liked horses and after a while, cattle, too." Id. at 81.
25. These social costs were borne, especially among the agricultural tribes of the Upper Mis-
souri River Basin, by the Indian women who were the chief food producers of those peoples. Profes-
sor Hurt cites the Indian women's agricultural role among the Mandan and Hidatsa Indians of that
region:
The hoe was the most important farm tool among these agriculturists, but it differed
from the implements that the eastern and western framers used, because it was fashioned
from the shoulder blade of a bison. Because bone hoes were not strong enough to break
the tough, fibrous prairie sod, these farmers confined their agricultural activities to the al-
luvial bottoms. Because only the flood plains were farmed, the fields were small, averaging
from one to four acres, and the women frequently traveled as far as ten miles to tend the
fields spread along the creeks and rivers.
HURT, supra note 12, at 58.
26. See infra Part II.C.
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ted lands into smaller and smaller, essentially valueless, economic inter-
ests. The problems also included the phenomenon of non-Indian lessees
gobbling up the available Indian grazing lands at favorable BIA-
established grazing rates.27
Collier's proposed solution to these problems was both simple and
ingenious. His goal was to restore eventually all of those lands within
the exterior boundaries of Indian reservations-the Indian allotted
lands, the non-Indian fee owned lands, and the so-called un-allotted or
surplus tribal lands-to tribal use and ownership. His proposed concep-
tual means to this end was the restoration of "tribal communalism" as
the driving economic and social force to salvage Indian Country from
these failed federal Indian policies.28
A new Indian agricultural policy, including a new Indian-ranching
policy, was Collier's chosen economic strategy whereby his plan to rede-
velop Indian Country would be realized. But to realize this goal, Collier
had to enable the Indian peoples somehow to re-capture tribal title to
over seventeen million acres of allotted Indian lands, including some
seven million acres of severely fractionalized, individually owned Indian
allotments. He envisioned an adequately funded tribal land re-
acquisition program that, over time, would restore tribal title to all those
lost tribal lands.29
But Collier was forced to compromise legislatively some of the
27. Non-Indian leasing of Indian grazing lands is explained by Professor Hurt as originating in
Indian Commissioner Teller's idea in 1883 that such a land-use policy could somehow help civilize
the Indians. He allowed the local Indian agents to lease Indian lands to non-Indian grazers at two
cents an acre because he thought that:
[A] few "responsible" [white] men could teach the Indians to become herders. "The Indi-
ans so employed," he wrote, "will soon become skillful herdsmen familiar with cattle rais-
ing ... and become stock raisers themselves." He thought that any Indians who were em-
ployed as herdsmen should be paid in cattle. As a result, the Indians soon would have
enough cattle to warrant the use of the entire grazing lands by themselves, and white cat-
tlemen would be displaced.
HURT, supra note 12, at 130.
28. Hurt asserts that Collier believed that:
[AIII efforts to acculturate and assimilate the Indians into white society had failed. Previ-
ous agricultural policy, with its accrual of allotment, heirship, and leasing problems, had
served only to destroy the inherent strengths of Indian tribal life. Henceforth the Indians
might become farmers, but they would not do so within the context of white culture. In-
stead, the Indians would retain their cultural uniqueness; no longer would they be forced to
emulate white farmers. Cultural pluralism, not acculturation and assimilation, was the key
to the Indian problem. Tribal communalism, rather than private individualism, Collier
maintained, would engender viable social alternatives to life based on the precepts of white
society.
Id. at 174.
29. Collier's ambitious tribal-land reacquisition plan, according to Hurt, was an enormous un-
dertaking:
The Indian lands that remained, Collier believed, had to be brought under a new system of
Indian ownership. The approximately 17 million acres of allotted lands and the 7 million
acres of heirship lands had to be "salvaged" for productive use by the Indians themselves
and "permanently safeguarded against voluntary or forced alienation." To achieve that
end, "deep readjustments," voluntary on the part of the Indians but supported by legisla-
tion to ensure success, were needed.
Id. at 177.
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more radical elements of his proposed act. Even so, his new Indian act,
known popularly as the Indian Re-organization Act (IRA) of 1934,30
declared several significant new Indian policies. It ended the Indian al-
lotment program, authorized an ambitious tribal land consolidation and
land re-acquisition program, and authorized Indian allottees to transfer
voluntarily title to their respective tribal governments. 31 But some In-
dian peoples actively opposed Collier's new Indian act because, in their
judgment, it was a potential threat to their long established land and re-
lated rights. 32 This ideological opposition, coupled with Collier's seem-
ingly heavy-handed and culturally insensitive tribal livestock reduction
programs, particularly on the Navajo Indian reservation, caused a large
minority of Indian peoples to refuse to adopt Collier's IRA.33
On the northern Great Plains, unlike the American Southwest, the
Indian ranchers suffered from an insufficient number of livestock, as
well as insufficient capital, land, and inferior breeding stocks. These
practical barriers prevented Indian ranchers from transitioning beyond
subsistence-level ranching to commercial-level livestock operations on
the northern high plains. 34  But those Indian ranchers did have some
unlikely allies in their struggle to expand and improve their ranching
operations. That era's twin scourges-the Dust Bowl and the Great
Depression-combined to bust many of the ranching operations of
those non-Indian grazing lessees who had long dominated ranching on
the reservations of the northern Great Plains. The Dust Bowl and the
Great Depression accomplished what the BIA had been unwilling or
unable to accomplish-expel those non-Indian lessees from Indian
Country. 3
5
Meanwhile, Indian ranchers, given the BIA's new Indian Cattle
Purchase Program, were able to improve significantly their livestock
herds through their acquisition of high-quality breed stock. That pro-
30. Pub. L. No. 73-383,48 Stat. 984 (1934).
31. See id Professor Hurt argues that despite Collier's compromises to win congressional ap-
proval for his bill, it nonetheless brought about powerful changes in Indian policy: "The compromise
bill extended the trust period indefinitely for Indian lands, restored unallotted and surplus lands to
tribal ownership, made possible the voluntary return of [tribal] allotments to communal control, and
provided for the addition of lands with an annual fund of $2 million." HURT, supra note 12, at 178.
32. For example, some Indians feared Collier's act "would now force them to give up their al-
lotments and their heirship rights to the tribe." HURT, supra note 12, at 178.
33. Professor Hurt contends that Collier was "upset that the returns [from tribal elections to
approve his act] were far less than unanimous." Id. at 179. Ultimately, seventy-seven tribes rejected
the act while 181 tribes accepted it. Id. The Navajo voted to reject the act "because Collier's oppo-
nents had convinced them that the act would permit the federal government to take their sheep and
goats in a stock-reduction program, and the Navajo believed that such a policy would make them
destitute." Id.
34. Hurt argues that livestock problems of the "Great Plains tribes stemmed from an inade-
quate number of cattle, which prevented the development of a viable livestock economy." Id at 183.
This factor, as well as "[ilnsufficient credit, deficient annuities, and inadequate breeding stock ...
[prevented] the plains tribes from building individual or tribal herds." Id
35. Hurt observes that by "1935, many white cattlemen who leased Indian grazing lands ... had
liquidated their herds." Id
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gram provided over 25,000 head of well-bred cattle at a total cost of
$800,000.36 While the BIA retained title to those cattle, the Indian
ranchers did get to choose the breed stock that best suited their respec-
tive reservation environments. These "ID" branded cattle were distrib-
uted to both eligible individual Indian ranchers as well the newly estab-
lished tribal-livestock corporations or cooperatives. This small federal
cattle relief program had a significant impact on Indian ranching-
before this program, 8,627 Indian ranchers owned 167,313 head of cat-
tle; after the program, 13,787 Indian ranchers owned 229,345 head of
cattle.37
Even more important, perhaps, was the BIA's efforts to establish
tribally owned livestock and cooperatives on the northern Great Plains.
The newly established Sioux livestock association in South Dakota, for
example, succeeded in greatly improving the quality and quantity of the
herds it either owned or that it managed on behalf of its members. Fur-
thermore, this association, and others like it, provided valuable help and
guidance to those young tribal members who wanted to enter the live-
stock industry and, perhaps later, become established, dues-paying
members of that association.38
These tribal livestock organizations also provided their tribal
members with other substantial benefits. For example, the Blackfeet
tribal livestock association was able to engage in large-scale cattle sales
that yielded, on average, a 12-30% higher sale price when compared
with those contemporary, small-scale cattle sales engaged in by non-
members.39 Furthermore, these new tribal organizations were able to
sponsor new cattle breeding techniques and management strategies that
36. Professor Hurt credits the Bureau of Indian Affairs's (BIA) "cattle purchase program" with
enabling qualified Indian ranchers to acquire high-quality and needed cattle:
In late summer 1934 the Department of Agriculture allocated $800,000 to the Department
of the Interior for the purchase of "well-bred" cattle in the drought-stricken area of the
Great Plains. All purchases were to be made in cooperation with the Aberdeen-Angus,
Shorthorn, and Hereford Breeder's associations, thereby benefiting white and Indian cat-
tlemen alike.
... Although administrative delays slowed the implementation of the program, the bu-
reau estimated that it would acquire 25,000 cattle through the drought cattle-purchase pro-
gram.
Id.
37. Id at 184.
38. Professor Hurt cites the successes of tribal livestock associations across the Great Plains, as
well as in the Southwest, as evidence of the "remarkable degree of success" that some of the ranching
tribes had realized by the late 1930s. Id at 185.
39. Professor Hurt acknowledges that the tribal livestock associations significantly assisted their
tribal members by enabling them to participate in large-scale cattle sales that increased the sale price
for the cattle they sold:
At the Blackfoot Agency in Montana, a cooperative marketing association earned prices
from 12 to 30 percent higher than those received by nonmembers. These associations made
the best use of reservation lands that were checkerboarded with allotted, tribal, and white
holdings. By fencing a large tract of land, association members could command a larger
amount of range land than individual operators could muster; thus small-scale cattlemen
could receive the same economies of scale that the larger operators enjoyed.
[Vol. 49
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were simply unavailable to the subsistence-level individual rancher.40
If Indian ranching progressed so much during the Indian New Deal
period, why did it not move beyond its subsistence-level origins to the
next level of commercially based tribally owned and managed ranching
operations? Somewhat surprisingly, Commissioner John Collier, and to
some extent the Indian leadership of that time, bear the shared respon-
sibility for this outcome. Collier, despite his seemingly boundless faith
in the Indian peoples, believed that it was both practically and politically
unwise for Indian ranchers to expand their livestock operations to the
commercial level of development. He feared that Congress, in response
to the non-Indian ranching industry's lobbying against what it perceived
as unfair competition from the Indian ranchers, would choose to end
Indian ranching, rather than have it compete with the non-Indian ranch-
ing industry on the northern Great Plains.41
Furthermore, the BIA's economic experts doubted whether a
commercial-level Indian-ranching industry could be practicably devel-
oped. They concluded that 9.7 million acres of new Indian grazing lands
would have to be acquired, just to ensure the existing Indian ranchers a
subsistence standard of living from their livestock operations.42 Fur-
thermore, they concluded that 15.9 million acres of new Indian grazing
lands would have to be acquired in order to ensure the Indian ranchers a
moderate standard of living from their ranching operations.43 At that
point, congressional appropriations had enabled the BIA to purchase
just 993,673 acres of new Indian lands. 44
However, Indian ranching's future was also limited by the Indian
peoples' strongly held beliefs and values that denigrated the notion of
individually motivated economic gain as a goal worth striving for at the
expense of all other values. This reality, coupled with the Indian peo-
40. Id.
41. Professor Hurt asserts that "Collier was seeking only to bring the Indian farmers up to a
subsistence level; he did not stress the goal of commercial production because he did not want Indian
farmers to compete with white agriculturists." Id at 192.
42. Professor Hurt criticizes Congress's failure to provide adequate funding during the 1930s for
the restoration to tribal ownership of the so-called "surplus lands" that had been removed from tribal
ownership by congressional action during the allotment era:
Bureau officials estimated that 3 million acres [of surplus and other lost tribal lands] could
be acquired, but Congress provided only $1 million for the purchase of new lands during
fiscal 1936. This funding hardly contributed to a needed land-acquisition program. Bureau
officials estimated that the Indians needed an additional 15.9 million acres to ensure a
"modest" standard of living from agriculture, while 9.7 million acres more were required to
bring the Indians up to the subsistence standard of living of an "average rural white fam-
ily."
Id. at 188.
43. Id.
44. "Congress's failure to provide [sufficient] funds for a significant land-acquisition program
... prevented any possibility of making either subsistence or commercial farmers out of the tribes-
men." Id. at 193. What little money Congress did appropriate for the tribal land acquisition period
allowed the BIA to acquire only a fraction of the lands needed for Indian commercial ranching de-
velopment on the northern Great Plains, as well as elsewhere in Indian Country. Id. at 188.
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pies' continuing esteem for the horse as a transcendent symbol of per-
sonal worth and esteem, meant that Indian ranchers did not see per-
sonal-wealth creation as a motivating factor to move beyond their sub-
sistence-level ranching operations. These enduring cultural values had
both specific economic and ecological consequences within the arid and
semi-arid rangelands of Indian Country. For example, the BIA's range
managers observed that it was not unusual for a single Navajo man to
own a hundred or more horses. Although that fact made no economic
or ecological sense to the BIA's rangers, it made perfect cultural and so-
cial sense to the Navajo man. His horses served him and his family as a
valuable "cultural currency" whereby they could be exchanged for a re-
spectable marriage arrangement, or they could provide a respected
ceremonial gift when that occasion arose.45
But other commentators contend that Collier's new Indian-
ranching policy was simply overtaken by larger national and world
events. By 1940, the federal government's attention and financial re-
sources were directed to the coming war in Europe.46 Therefore, Indian
ranchers simply were left to fend for themselves, given the federal gov-
ernment's larger national responsibilities to all of the American people.
Although, as of 1939, some 16,624 Indian ranchers owned some 262,551
head of livestock,4 7 they desperately needed more cattle and capital to
improve and build their livestock herds. But the needed federal aid was
not forthcoming, and by 1942, driven by high war time cattle and land
prices, non-Indian ranchers were once again leasing virtually every acre
of Indian grazing land that was not being used by its Indian owners.48
C Answering Question Number Three: What Were Indian Ranching's
Socio-Cultural Impacts on the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara People of
the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation?
I have argued that Indian ranching was, perhaps, the federal gov-
ernment's only successful Indian-civilizing strategy. But that claim
45. Professor Hurt contends that the BIA's Navajo "horse-reduction program still was an emo-
tional issue, because the animals had a 'high prestige value' for their owners." Id at 189. Horses
provided their Navajo owners not only with recreational opportunities, they also "enabled them to
make gift exchanges for marriages, and served for ceremonial purposes." Id.
46. Professor Hurt identifies 1940 as the year in which Congress lost interest in funding the
costly tribal land re-acquisition program. He emphasizes that congressional "appropriations [for that
program] had nearly ceased by 1940, because many congressmen believed the expenditures were
wasteful." Id. But according to Hurt, the real reason for this congressional change of heart was be-
cause "the drift towards a new European war essentially ended the agricultural progress of the Indian
New Deal." Id.
47. Professor Hurt argues that even the limited progress made by Indian ranchers during the
1930s was jeopardized by the BIA's failure to come to grips with economic and social realities that
impeded the Indian ranchers' likelihood of real success. "Although 16,624 Indians raised 262,551
cattle in 1939, insufficient credit, despite the 'repayment cattle pool,' prevented the adequate expan-
sion of the industry. In addition, the leasing system kept many potential cattlemen in a state of leth-
argy and poverty." Id.
48. Id. at 191.
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leaves unanswered the question as to what was Indian ranching's con-
temporary impact upon a long established, culturally conservative, tribal
people. In answering this question, I have chosen my home Indian res-
ervation, the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, as the case study of
ranching's demonstrable socio-cultural impact on a historically signifi-
cant tribal people -the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation. My goal
is not to argue that Indian ranching is either good or bad, but to docu-
ment my assertion that the rise of Indian ranching had subtle and not-
so-subtle acculturating impacts on the tribal peoples of the northern
Great Plains.
The Mandan people had occupied the river bottoms along the Up-
per Missouri River and its tributaries many centuries ago.49 They, along
with those tribal peoples who later joined them-the Hidatsa and Ari-
kara-are the so-called "village Indians" who resided in their famed
earth lodge settlements along the bottomlands of the Upper Missouri
River Basin. They established and maintained a remarkable agricultur-
ally based economy by their farming of the rich, alluvial soils that were
annually deposited on their lands by the flooding of the Missouri River.
Their historic corn-based culture, wherein the Mandan, Hidatsa and
Arikara women enjoyed a distinctive socio-cultural role in producing
the bulk of the food products, has been the subject of many scholarly
studies.50 These tribal peoples' special relationship with the lands along
the Missouri River embodied an interlacing of sexual, social, and eco-
nomic statuses that dominated and defined their way of life. Professor
Virginia Peters powerfully depicts the Indian women's complicated
land-based relationship:
Many young men and a few of the old helped pick the ears of ripe corn
as they had during the green corn harvest. For this the women paid them
by building fires near their piles of corn on which they placed kettles con-
taining corn and meat. The men and girls were all painted and dressed in
their best clothes. The prettiest girls always had the largest group of
young men around their piles of corn. As the husking proceeded, any un-
ripe ears were [placed] aside to become the property of the male helpers.
They either ate them or fed them to their ponies; the women did not want
them because they would rot and spoil the ripe corn if placed in caches.
Although there was much rejoicing and jollity at harvest time, there
was a serious undertone. The village women felt a sacred duty to be sure
that every ear of corn was gathered and used for some purpose. A mis-
sionary told Wilson that an Arikara woman whom she knew dropped
every seed with a kind of prayer. The Arikara legend of "The Forgotten
Ear" emphasizes the women's love for their gardens and the food they
49. Professor Meyer asserts that "as early as A.D. 900 and perhaps two centuries earlier, agri-
cultural groups began to occupy the region." RoY W. MEYER, THE VILLAGE INDIANS OF THE UPPER
MissouRi: THE MANDANS, HIDATSAS, AND ARIKARAS 5 (1977).
50. Professor Meyer asserts that "horticulture, food-handling, and the maintenance of the
lodges were the women's tasks." Id. at 75.
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produce. One day an Arikara woman thought she heard a child begging
not to be left behind when she started to leave her field. She searched
through her whole garden until at last she finally found one small ear of
corn which she had overlooked. As soon as she gathered in the ear of
corn, the crying stopped.5'
But these tribal people's long established relationship with their
gardens and their lands ended with the coming of land allotment to the
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in the late nineteenth century. One
commentator, Castle McLaughlin, has studied in some detail the socio-
cultural impact of Indian ranching on these tribal people.52 For that rea-
son, I rely on his research to document my assertion that Indian ranch-
ing may well have been the federal government's only successful Indian-
civilizing initiative.
McLaughlin emphasized that Indian allotment on Fort Berthold
and other Great Plains Indian reservations had as its goal the "dissolu-
tion of tribal organization and the assimilation of Indian individuals" via
"the adoption of practices and values associated with a capitalist democ-
racy, such as nuclear family organization, Christianity, the 'Protestant
ethic,' and utilitarianism. '
53
He also described the contemporary rise of Indian ranching on Fort
Berthold as a direct result of the allotment process:
As on other reservations, agrarian enterprises-first farming, then live-
stock production-were used as a vehicle for promoting individual "civili-
zation" at Fort Berthold. Cattle were first distributed as part of a federal
payment following an 1886 agreement . . . by which the Fort Berthold
people relinquished 228,168 acres of their 1,193,788-acre reservation and
agreed to the allotment of the remaining 965,620 acres. Between that
year and 1902, the U.S. government spent 140,000 dollars of tribal funds
on livestock, and the number of Indian-owned cattle rose from 416 to
7,000 head. Prior to a 1910 land cession, the sale of beef to the govern-
ment and to markets such as Chicago accounted for nearly half of the to-
tal income on the reservation. While "unearned income" from land sales
and leases became the most significant income source after 1910, during
the following decade the value of crops raised ($367,549) and livestock
sold ($419,984) at Fort Berthold far surpassed income from (primarily per
diem) wage labor ($144,951). 4
McLaughlin argued that allotment, as well as the other related fed-
eral assistance programs directed to foster Indian-ranching enterprises
on the Fort Berthold Reservation, have resulted in on-going conflict be-
tween the Indian landowning community and the Indian ranching com-
munity. Here is how he describes this conflict in the 1980s and 1990s on
Fort Berthold:
51. VIRGINIA BERGMAN PETERS, WOMEN OF THE EARTHLODGES: TRIBAL LIFE ON THE
PLAINS 119-20 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
52. Castle McLaughlin, Nation, Tribe, and Class: The Dynamics of Agrarian Transformation on
the Fort Berthold Reservation, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RESERVATION J. 101 (1998).
53. Id. at 106.
54. Id. at 106-07 (footnotes omitted).
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Class consciousness has developed from both opposing material interests
and contrasting ideological and moral frameworks that guide interaction
between people and the natural world. Landowners have been led to as-
sign commodity values to their lands and have constructed their identity
in part from their inability to control and realize "fair returns" for its use;
they have developed a keen sense of their position within the local politi-
cal economy. Unequal relations of exchange, not production per se, have
engendered the construction of these class identities. Ranchers are
viewed as having repudiated the signs and practice of reciprocity, which
both functions as a material "safety net" and serves as a metaphor for the
commensal social order: "Half of us are starving, but they'd die before
they'd give us a beef." Age, gender (most landowners are tribal elders,
and today many are women), internally perceived racial differences
(many ranchers are of mixed heritage), and commitment to traditional
values are all drawn on for the discursive construction of materially re-
produced differences. One young landowner characterized conflict be-
tween ranchers, landowners, and the tribe as "spiritual warfare" and fore-
cast, "Eventually the tribe will end up buying all of the land, and then
Uncle Sam will come and collect."
55
McLaughlin further argues that the new Indian-ranching class was
born directly out of allotment and related federal assimilation policies
on the Fort Berthold Reservation:
[T]he government "patronage system" rewarded this incipient private sec-
tor through the provision of unsecured reimbursable loans and by utilizing
proceeds from tribal land sales for the establishment of demonstration
farms and for the purchase of high-grade livestock. Such practices were
frequently protested by older traditional leaders, who regarded such use
of tribal funds as inequitable and whose formal influence and ability to
redistribute goods were undermined by the emergent agrarian entrepre-
neurs. Initially, ranchers organized economic labor and galvanized sup-
port within indigenous social institutions such as kinship groups, using
their skills and relative wealth to become prominent leaders. Under pres-
sure to assimilate and increasingly invested in market exchange, by the
1920s and 1930s agrarian entrepreneurs had begun to disengage partially
from such social and moral networks and associated responsibilities. As
the child of a successful Fort Berthold rancher recalled, "My father wasn't
much of a 'pow-wowzer'; he regarded dances and give-aways as a waste of
time and money."
56
Furthermore, McLaughlin concludes that some of the more suc-
cessful Indian ranchers sought to avoid BIA regulation of their grazing
practices. They converted their trust patent lands to fee patent status.
This led one agency superintendent to charge that at least "forty 'of the
more intelligent and thrifty' Indians were avoiding the reservation-
wide cattle round-ups and working their stock without agency supervi-
sion.57
In sum, whether or not Indian ranching was the best Indian-
55. Id. at 124 (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 107-08 (footnotes omitted).
57. Id. at 108.
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civilizing initiative possible, it nonetheless had significant socio-cultural
impacts on the tribal people of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.
My overall point is that Indian ranching, insofar as it was a successful
acculturating mechanism, may have helped bridge the vast socio-cultural
gulf that existed, and still exists, between the Indian and non-Indian so-
cieties on the northern Great Plains.
D. Answering Question Number Four. Why Did the Federal
Government Seemingly Abandon Its Indian-Ranching Policy During
the "Termination Era" of the 1950s and Early 1960s?
Indian ranching confronted new and different challenges during the
so-called "termination era" of the 1950s and the early 1960s. My analy-
sis of this era's impact on Indian ranching revolves around the following
issues.
1. The BIA Re-Evaluated Its Indian-Ranching Policy
Collier's successor as Indian Commissioner, William Brophy, be-
lieved that American agriculture "had entered a new age and that suc-
cessful farming in the future would require larger farms, the intensive
application of science and technology, and expanded capital invest-
ment. '58 He also recognized that Indian ranchers and Indian agricultu-
ralists had none of the required resources available to them. For that
reason, he concluded that Indian ranching would, during this new agri-
cultural era, prove "insufficient in quantity and quality., 59 But Indian
ranchers did not agree with Brophy's bleak assessment of their future,
and they wanted more federal financial aid and technical assistance to
improve and enlarge their ranching operations. But during the war
years, the BIA's congressional funding for its tribal land reacquisition
and consolidation efforts had virtually dried up. This factor, combined
with the accelerating fractionalization of Indian heirship lands on the
northern Great Plains' reservations, meant that Indian ranching was fac-
ing a real crisis, if not outright catastrophe.6 °
58. HURT, supra note 12, at 195.
59. Id
60. Professor Hurt comments that the federal government's Indian ranching and agriculture
policies during this era had trapped the Indians in a "vicious cycle":
They could not obtain the necessary capital to expand and develop viable economic enter-
prises. Their inefficient operations and limited managerial abilities, compared to those of
many university-trained white farmers, prevented lenders from having the confidence
needed for granting loans to Indian farmers, and without land reform, even the best agricul-
tural managers could not make Indian lands economically viable.
Id at 209.
[Vol. 49
HeinOnline  -- 49 Washburn L.J. 766 2009-2010
2010] Keeping the American Indian Rancher on the Land 767
2. Indian Ranching as the BIA's Most Successful Agricultural Program
Indian ranching-the most lucrative form of Indian agriculture-
had previously generated significant income for Indian-ranching fami-
lies, particularly on the northern Great Plains. Indian ranching had
generated over $16.3 million in 1945, thus, far outstripping the $1.3 mil-
lion in income derived from ranching in 1932.61 Indian-ranching families
also derived significant in-kind income benefits from this source in 1945:
They directly consumed some $9.2 million worth of beef at their family
tables that year.62 To be fair, the BIA's Indian agricultural service was
not totally inactive during the 1950s. It sought to organize hundreds of
reservation-based Indian 4-H clubs, thereby instilling in the Indian
youth an early interest in the ranching lifestyle. But the federal gov-
ernment's growing termination fever did begin to impact adversely in-
come from ranching. The average Indian rancher's annual income was
$918 in 1947. By 1949, however, his average annual income had
dropped to $500.63
3. The Socio-Legal Impact of Termination
Congress's formal initiation of its Indian-termination policy, com-
mencing with its 1953 enactment of House Concurrent Resolution 108,
64
truly threatened the future existence of Indian ranching on the northern
Great Plains, as well as elsewhere in Indian Country. A terminated In-
dian rancher faced both dire and immediate consequences. Upon ter-
mination, that Indian rancher would lose access to the BIA's agricul-
tural credit programs and its cattle acquisition programs. Given that
Indian ranchers historically lacked access to private agricultural credit
sources, as well as other agricultural credit sources generally available to
non-Indian ranchers, both those experienced Indian ranchers who
wanted to improve their ranching operations as well as those young In-
dian ranchers who wanted to enter the livestock business, depended on
the BIA's financial and technical assistance. Termination, by ending
Indian ranchers' access to those BIA programs, meant that their Indian-
ranching opportunities would wither on the vine.65
61. Professor Hurt candidly asserts that Indian ranching was, by far, the most significant eco-
nomic component of Indian agriculture. "Moreover, cattle raising, the most important part of Indian
agriculture, grossed more than $16.3 million in sales during 1945-a substantial increase from the less
than $1.3 million in 1932. The tribesmen also consumed an estimated $9.2 million worth of beef at
home." Id at 196.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 197-98.
64. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. 132 (1953).
65. See HURT, supra note 12, at 209.
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4. Termination's Impact on the Indian Peoples of the Northern Great
Plains
The termination era's policies, in terms of their direct and indirect
effects on Indian ranching, contributed to greatly increased non-Indian
leasing of Indian grazing lands on the northern Great Plains. More than
600,000 acres of Indian grazing lands on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation
were leased to non-Indian ranchers, some two-thirds of the total amount
of those lands. And more than 50% of the Indian grazing lands on the
Blackfeet Reservation were leased to non-Indian ranchers during this
period.66  Furthermore, the BIA's de-emphasis of its Indian-ranching
programs resulted in a dramatic drop in the number of Indian ranchers,
as well as the size of their livestock herds. The number of Indian ranch-
ers on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation decreased from 203 to 129 during
this period, with more than 90% of the full-blood Indian ranchers
choosing to exit that industry. 6
7
Moreover, the BIA's new termination-era policies helped to down-
size the Indian ranchers' livestock herds. More than 40% of the Indian
ranchers on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation had fewer than twenty
head of cattle. More than 80% of the Indian ranchers on the Fort Peck
Indian Reservation had fewer than 100 head of cattle, the absolute
minimum amount of cattle that was deemed necessary for a viable
ranching operation.68
5. The Socio-Economic Impact of the BIA's Exit from Indian Ranching
The termination era's larger Indian assimilation goals, coupled with
the BIA's virtual withdrawal from the Indian-ranching business, pushed
the existing Indian-ranching enterprises into a downward spiral.69
Given that few Indian-ranching enterprises were deemed to meet the
threshold standards for viable ranching operations- meaning that they
lacked the required number of cattle or other livestock, the appropriate
kind and quality of ranch machinery, and the appropriate level of ranch
66. Professor Hurt argues that termination's indirect impact was to increase significantly non-
Indian leasing of Indian grazing lands on several Indian reservations on the northern Great Plains:
Between 1950 and 1960, two-thirds, or 600,000 acres, of South Dakota's Rosebud Res-
ervation was leased to whites. Although these Sioux did not alienate much land during that
decade, the number of Sioux cattlemen shrank from 203 to 129, with 90 percent of the de-
cline occurring among full bloods.
The agricultural situation was similar on Montana's Blackfeet Reservation, approxi-
mately 50 percent of which was leased to white operators.
Id. at 201-02.
67. Id. at 208.
68. Id. at 202-03,208.
69. Id. at 209.
[Vol. 49
HeinOnline  -- 49 Washburn L.J. 768 2009-2010
2010] Keeping the American Indian Rancher on the Land 769
management skills-they were generally deemed "bad credit risks" by
private agricultural lenders. Due to the BIA's exit from the Indian-
ranching business, Indian ranchers would soon find themselves effec-
tively barred from private agricultural credit sources.7 0
The intervening decades, from the 1970s to the 1990s, introduced a
new and significant federal actor-the United States Department of Ag-
riculture (USDA)-into the arena of Indian ranching on the northern
Great Plains. The next Section assesses and evaluates the successes and
failures wrought by that federal agency in its efforts to promote Indian
ranching as an economically and socially viable industry on the northern
high plains.
a. The State of Indian Ranching Today
About 38% of today's 80,000 Indian farm operators are classified
by the USDA's 2007 Indian farm census as beef cattle ranchers. 7' Fur-
thermore, this farm census also documents the relative non-competitive
economic and social status of these Indian ranchers. For example, it re-
veals that Indian ranchers derive substantially less income from their
ranching operations when compared with non-Indian ranch and farm
operators. It shows the average Indian rancher had 2007 annual farm
sales valued at $40,331, while the average non-Indian rancher had 2007
annual farm sales valued at $134,887.72 This disparity in ranch-related
sales occurred despite the fact that the average Indian-owned ranching
operation is, on average, significantly larger than non-Indian ranching
operations: approximately 1,431 acres compared to 418 acres.73
Furthermore, the USDA's 2007 Indian farm census report has been
subjected to scathing criticism by American Indian farm advocacy
groups. First, the non-profit law center, Farmers' Legal Action Group,
Inc. (FLAG), criticized the farm census's failure to emphasize the fact
that only 1.6% of the population of principal-farm operators is Ameri-
can Indian. 74 Second, the advocacy organization Village Earth charac-
terized that census report as a "gross misrepresentation of the data" re-
garding the contemporary state of Indian ranching. 75 It pointed out that
Indian farm operators, in total, earned only some 16% of the total 2007
70. Id.
71. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 2007 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 1,3 (2009), available athttp://www.
agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Online-Highlights/Fact-Sheets/american-indian.pdf.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id.
74. Minority Farmers, http://aglaw.blogspot.com/2009/10/iminority-farmers.html (Oct. 18, 2009,
13:18 CST). The farm census report pointed out that 94% of principal farm operators are white. Id
75. USDA Misrepresents Situation of Native American Farmers, http://villageearth.org/pages/
Projects/Pine-Ridge/pineridgeblog/2009/11/usda-misepresents-situation-of-native.htmI (Nov. 4, 2009,
22:00 MST).
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farm sales revenue of $1.6 billion.76 That organization also criticized the
USDA's report for failing to address the underlying legal and credit-
based reasons why Indian ranchers now confront such dire challenges:
As reported earlier by Village Earth, the unequal land-use patterns seen
on Native American Reservations today is a direct outcome of discrimina-
tory lending practices, land fractionation and specifically Federal policies.
• . that have excluded native land owners from the ability to utilize their
lands while at the same time opening them up to non-native farmers and
ranchers. Discriminatory lending practices, as argued in court cases such
as the pending Keepseagle vs. Vilsack, claim that Native Americans have
been denied roughly [$]3 billion in credit. Another significant obstacle is
the high degree of fractionation of Reservation lands caused by the Gen-
eral Allotment Act (GAA) of 1887. Over a century of unplanned inheri-
tance under the GAA has created a situation where reservation lands
have become severely fractionated. Today, for a Native land owner to
consolidate and utilize his or her allotted lands they may have to get the
signed approval of dozens, hundreds or even thousands of separate land
owners. As a result of this complexity, most Indian land owners have few
options besides leasing their lands out as part of the Federal Govern-
ment's leasing program. Additionally, historical and racially-based poli-
cies by the Federal government have been designed to exclude Native
American farmers and ranchers from utilizing their own lands, opening
them up to non-natives for a fraction of their... market value.
7 7
Surprisingly, perhaps, the USDA's expert defense witness in the
Keepseagle v. Venneman78 litigation, Dr. Dean Leuck, generally agrees
with the critiques offered by both FLAG and Village Earth as to why
Indian ranching is in such dire straits on the northern Great Plains. His
expert analysis of Indian ranching confirms these Indian advocacy
groups' conclusions that long standing legal, jurisdictional, and credit-
based barriers have significantly undermined Indian ranching on the
heavily allotted Indian reservations on the northern Great Plains. For
example, he cites the allotment era's policies as creating the checker-
boarded land tenure situation that now bedevils the tribal governments'
efforts to regulate land use effectively with their respective reservation
boundaries. "The allotment era had a relatively large impact on the
Northern Tier states of Idaho, North and South Dakota, Montana,
Wyoming and Washington. These reservations tend to have an even
more complicated land tenure mosaic than reservations in other re-
gions."
79
He concludes that these allotment-era policies still adversely im-
pact Indian ranching today:
This complicated mosaic of Indian land tenure [on the Indian reserva-
tions of the northern Great Plains] is laden with counterproductive incen-
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. No. Civ.A.9903119EGS1712, 2001 WL 34676944 (D.D.C. Dec. 12,2001).
79. Expert Report of Dr. Dean Leuck, at 24, Keepseagle v. Venneman, No. Civ.A.9903119
EGS1712, 2001 WL 34676944 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2001) (on file with author).
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tives. These incentives make it difficult to organize land and labor to
maximize land value, thus making it difficult to get loans and access capi-
tal markets. Each type of land tenure carries associated economic incen-
tives that impact the use, management, and productivity of the land and
affect lending decisions. Otherwise identical neighbors might encounter
very different responses from the capital markets if one parcel is held in
fee title and the other is in trust status.
Given the counterproductive economic incentives inherent in the cur-
rent land tenure mosaic on many western Indian reservations, even pro-
grams that direct loans to Native American farmers are unlikely to result
in equal outcomes among Indian and non-Indian farmers and ranchers.
80
Dr. Leuck argued that the "counterproductive economic incentives
inherent in the current land tenure mosaic" are to blame for the dire fi-
nancial condition of Indian ranching, not the asserted discriminatory
treatment of Indian ranchers by the USDA; nonetheless, the federal
government has recently pledged to settle the Keepseagle litigation.
81
b. How the Lack ofAvailable Credit Has Crippled Indian Ranching on
the Northern Great Plains
Indian ranchers on the northern Great Plains rely almost exclu-
sively on federal direct loans from the Farm Services Administration
(FSA) because they do not meet the credit-worthiness requirements im-
posed by private farm credit lenders. 82 Furthermore, Indian ranchers
tend to cluster on the Great Plains, and they tend to operate larger
ranches than do non-Indian ranchers. Additionally, only one-third of
those minority ranchers serviced by the FSA, including Indian ranchers,
reported farm-related sales of more than $10,000 in 1997.83 In contrast,
more than one-half of all other farmers and ranchers reported farm-
related sales in excess of that amount. 84
The FSA administers both the direct and guaranteed farm loan
programs made especially available to those "socially disadvantaged
farmers" who cannot qualify for private farm credit. Given that Indian
ranchers, who are classified as minority farmers by the USDA, tend to
have relatively low average incomes and limited asset bases, they are
unlikely to qualify for farm credit assistance from private lenders. Fur-
thermore, USDA statistics show that those Indian ranchers, particularly
80. Id. at 29.
81. See Ken Thomas, USDA Committed to Resolving Suit by American Indians, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2009, available athttp://www.washingtontimes.comlnews/2009/nov/07/usda-committed-to-reso
Iving-suit-by-american-india/.
82. Steve Koenig & Charles Dodson, FSA Credit Programs Target Minority Farmers, AGRIC.
OUTLOOK, Nov. 1999, at 14, available athttp://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/agoutlook/nov1999/
ao266e.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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those who reside in the counties on or near Indian reservations, tend to
rely on the FSA as their only available source of capital.85
The FSA sets aside a portion of its annual available loan funds for
use by its socially disadvantaged loan applicants, including eligible In-
dian ranchers. This set aside is based on its estimate of the number of
potentially eligible socially disadvantaged loan applicants who reside in
a given state or county. For example, in 1999, the FSA lent approxi-
mately $296 million, about 8% of its total loan obligations, to socially
disadvantaged farmers or ranchers.86 Although minority farmers and
ranchers comprised only 4% of the total farmer and rancher population
in 1999, they comprised 7% of all direct borrowers from the FSA that
year.87 Because the FSA does not follow the same lending practices as
do private farm credit lenders, minority ranchers, including the Indian
ranchers on the northern Great Plains, tend to see that federal lending
agency as their only available source of farm credit.88
E. Answering Ouestion Number Five: How to Put "HumptyDumpty"
Back Together Again: Designing an Adequate Legislative Settlement
Framework for Restoring Indian Ranching on the Northern Great
Plains
1. Scope of the Task
Restoring Indian ranching on the northern Great Plains can be lik-
ened to the daunting task of putting "Humpty Dumpty" back together
again. Despite the difficult challenges presented, I believe that my pro-
posed "Tribal Land Consolidation Plus" strategy may offer some hope
for the restoration of Indian ranching on the northern Great Plains. A
vigorous and adequately funded tribal land consolidation program will
be a necessary, but not sufficient, step toward the re-establishment of
Indian ranching on the northern Great Plains. Furthermore, my pro-
posal takes seriously the Obama Administration's pledges to settle fairly
the pending Cobell v. BabbitI1 9 and Keepseagle lawsuits.90 In that re-
gard, my proposal builds upon the administration's declared commit-
ment to settle those two Indian lawsuits.
My proposed plan for the restoration of Indian ranching envisions
the following three elements: (1) an adequately funded, comprehensive
85. Id.
86. Id. at 14-15.
87. See id. at l5.
88. Id.
89. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), ahfdsubnom. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d
1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
90. Keepseagle v. Venneman, No. Civ.A.9903119EGSI712, 2001 WL 34676944 (D.D.C. Dec.
12,2001).
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tribal land consolidation program; (2) the statutory establishment of tri-
bally chartered livestock-grazing authorities that are empowered to ex-
ercise comprehensive land-use control over grazing, by either Indian or
non-Indian ranchers, within tribally designated grazing districts; and (3)
the statutory establishment of a substantially enlarged federally spon-
sored program of financial and technical assistance to Indian-ranch op-
erators.
Based on the federal government's well-acknowledged plenary au-
thority over Indian economic and social affairs within Indian Country,
my proposal assumes there will be no insurmountable legal barriers to
the congressional enactment of my proposed legislatively declared ob-
jectives. The pending fulfillment of the Obama Administration's pledge
to settle these two lawsuits provides the immediate catalyst for this op-
portunity to restore Indian ranching on the northern Great Plains.91
Somewhat fortuitously, the federal government's recent successful set-
tlement of a minority farmers' lawsuit- a lawsuit that is strikingly simi-
lar to the Keepseagle litigation-provides a potential settlement model
for structuring some of the financial and managerial elements of my
proposal for the restoration of Indian ranching on the northern Great
Plains.92
91. The Department of the Interior's recently proposed Cobellsettlement appropriately focuses
on resolving the land fractionation problem. In a series of questions and answers, the Department
explains why its $2 billion Indian land consolidation program is an essential feature of this settlement:
What is the land consolidation program? How did the parties arrive at the $2 billion
land consolidation figure?
The land consolidation fund addresses an historic legacy of the General Allotment Act of
1887 (the "Dawes Act"), which divided tribal lands into parcels between 40 and 160 acres in
size, allotted them to individual Indians and sold off all remaining unallotted Indian lands.
As original allottees died, their intestate heirs received an equal, undivided interest in the
allottees' lands. Today, it is common to have hundreds of Indian owners for one parcel.
As of September 30, 2009, there were 143,663 individual Indian allotments and more than
four million fractionated interests. These four million interests could expand to 11 million
interests by the year 2030 unless an aggressive approach to fractionation is taken. The $2
billion land consolidation program will provide for the voluntary buy-back of fractionated
land interests. By reducing the number of individual trust accounts that the U.S[.] must
maintain, the program will greatly reduce on-going administrative expenses and future ac-
counting-related disputes. In order to provide owners with an additional incentive to sell
their fractionated interests, the settlement authorizes the Interior Department to set aside
up to 5 percent of the value of the interests into a college and vocational school scholarship
fund for American Indian students.
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Cobell v. Salazar: Q & As, http://www.doi.gov/documents/Cobell_v
SalazarQA.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Q & As].
The department's proposal also candidly admits the adverse economic effects that land frac-
tionation inflicts upon the individual Indian land owners and the tribal governments' initiatives to
manage Indian grazing lands among other tribal land resource values:
What are the economic consequences of fractionation?
The economic consequences of fractionation are severe. Appraisal studies suggest that
when the number of owners per tract of land grows to between ten and twenty, the fair
market value associated with each interest declines -- often precipitously. Fractionated in-
terests, however, still hold cultural and historical significance for many individual allottees.
Id. The Obama Administration also has pledged to settle the Keepseagle lawsuit on fair terms to the
Indian plaintiffs. See Thomas, supra note 81.
92. Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 105 (D.D.C. 1999).
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2. The Major Elements of My Proposal
The fair and thorough implementation of the major elements of my
proposal likely would go some distance toward restoring Indian ranch-
ing as a viable economic and social endeavor on the northern Great
Plains.
Tribal Land Consolidation
My proposed legislative settlement framework contemplates the
enactment of a tribal land consolidation initiative that will focus primar-
ily, but not exclusively, on the restoration of tribal land title to the
roughly seven million acres of highly fractionalized, individually owned,
Indian-allotted lands. This problem is particularly significant on the
heavily allotted Indian reservations of the northern Great Plains. I rec-
ognize that the cost of this undertaking, even assuming a "rock bottom"
average purchase price of $1000 per acre for the acquisition of these
identified lands, would likely exceed $7 billion in total.
But of almost equal importance, particularly on the grazing-
oriented northern Great Plains reservations, is a statutory focus on the
tribal acquisition and consolidation of high-quality grazing lands, includ-
ing the acquisition of high quality forage producing lands, whether those
lands are fractionated lands or not. It would be up to the affected In-
dian people, in consultation with the BIA, to formulate an appropriate
and adequate tribal land consolidation plan for their particular portion
of Indian Country. Although the Obama Administration's proposed
amount for tribal land consolidation purposes is about $2 billion, even
such a relatively small tribal land consolidation fund could, if thought-
fully and judiciously administered, go some distance, particularly on the
heavily "checkerboarded" reservations of the northern high plains, to-
ward restoring the Indian grazing industry.93
Tribal Livestock Regulatory Authority
My proposed legislative settlement framework also contemplates
the creation of new, statutorily authorized, tribal regulatory entities
called Tribal Livestock Regulatory Authorities. These new regulatory
entities, endowed with the necessary and appropriate managerial and
jurisdictional authority, would be responsible, subject to the review and
approval of the BIA, for the establishment and comprehensive man-
93. "Checkerboarding" refers to the alternating pattern of land ownership and results in the
jurisdictional exclusion of tribal regulatory authority, generally speaking, over those lands held in fee-
simple tenure by non-Indian landowners within Indian Country. See Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 565-67 (1981) (holding that Indian tribes generally lack civil regulatory authority over non-
Indian owners of fee-status lands within Indian Country).
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agement of suitably sized and ecologically sustainable Tribal Grazing
Districts. These statutorily authorized tribal authorities would be em-
powered-either by Congress's recognition of the Indian peoples' in-
herent authority or by Congress's delegation of the necessary regulatory
authority-to exercise regulatory authority over all lands (including in-
dividually owned allotted lands, non-Indian owned fee lands, and tri-
bally owned lands) that are located within tribally established tribal
grazing districts.94
Federal Trust Duty to Provide Adequate Federal Financial and
Technical Assistance to Indian Ranchers
The federal government's well-acknowledged federal trust duty to
Indian ranchers would provide the needed legislative authority for Con-
gress's restoration of an economically and socially viable tribal livestock
industry on the northern Great Plains. The existing legal definition of
"Indian trust agency" would be broadened to include not only the BIA
and other Indian-oriented agencies of the Interior Department but all of
those federal agencies that administer financial or technical assistance
programs that are intended for the benefit of Indian ranchers.
Additionally, each newly defined Indian trust agency would be au-
thorized to enter into tribal self-determination contracts or related
agreements with the affected tribal governments. This new trust-based
relationship would help ensure that available federal and technical assis-
tance benefits are provided to the Indian peoples in a manner consistent
with tribally identified needs and priorities. Furthermore, a new ade-
quately staffed and funded inter-agency "working group" would be es-
tablished-one that includes appropriate representatives from the ex-
port and international trade oriented federal agencies, such as the
Department of Commerce. This working group would be charged with
developing, in consultation with the affected tribal governments and the
94. The past success of tribally owned and managed livestock associations supports the statu-
tory establishment of tribally owned and managed grazing regulatory authorities that are clothed
with the power to oversee and manage all livestock owners located within any tribally established
grazing district. Indeed, absent such a statutory innovation, it may be unlikely that Indian ranching
can be restored on the northern Great Plains Indian reservations. Professor Hurt seems to agree
implicitly that such radical regulatory innovations are required to overcome the legacy of Indian al-
lotment:
Inheritance policies that divided estates among the heirs further fragmented Indian
landholdings and made leasing not only a necessity but a way of life. As a result, the
dreams and promises for an agricultural life that would enable the Indians to acculturate
and assimilate moved further and further from reality. At the same time, governmental
policy made the alienation of Indian lands increasingly easy, and the land base of the
tribesmen was rapidly disappearing by the early twentieth century. With every acre of land
lost to white control or ownership, the creation of a viable agricultural economy that would
provide subsistence and, eventually, commercial profitability became increasingly harder to
achieve.
HURT, supra note 12, at 232.
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interested Indian livestock industry representatives, the appropriate
tribal livestock marketing strategies and programs whereby Indian
ranchers can secure reasonable access to the increasingly significant, in-
ternational export markets for Indian owned livestock.
These elements of my proposal would largely replace the griev-
ously incomplete and fragmented statutory and regulatory framework
that presently governs Indian ranching.95
An Indian land use organization's recent report has criticized the
federal government for its failure to address those practical barriers that
presently constrain the Indian peoples' ability to utilize effectively their
property rights as the appropriate self-help means for their realization
of their economic and social development goals within Indian Country.
This report cites the fractionated ownership of individually allotted In-
dian lands and their checker-boarded pattern of land ownership as the
major reasons why Indian property rights cannot be effectively devel-
oped for the Indian peoples' benefit. 96 That report also cites the lack of
credit availability, from either federal or private sources, as a major rea-
son why Indian ranchers and Indian farmers are unable to establish and
maintain viable ranching and farming operations. 97
3. How the Obama Administration's Fair and Thoughtful Settlement of
the Two Pending Indian Lawsuits Could Help Promote the Restoration
of Indian Ranching on the Northern Great Plains
The Obama Administration has recently committed to the legisla-
tive settlement of the two pending Indian lawsuits against the federal
government known as Cobelf8 and Keepseagle.99  Furthermore, the
federal government's recent settlement of the minority farmer lawsuit
95. Unfortunately, the major Indian agricultural resources statute, the American Indian Agri-
cultural and Resources Management Act of 1993, does little to ameliorate these cited barriers to the
development of Indian grazing enterprises on the heavily allotted reservations of the northern Great
Plains. See American Indian Agricultural Resource Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3746
(2006). That act does explicitly recognize that "Indian agricultural lands ... are vital to the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural welfare of many Indian tribes and their members." Id. § 3701(3). But its
provisions do not address the fractionated lands problem or the jurisdictional checkerboarding issue
that have contributed to the defeat of any contemporary tribal initiatives that are directed at the re-
alization of that act's tribal, social, and economic development goals. For that reason, that act's posi-
tive goals of "increased economic returns, enhance[d] Indian self-determination, [increased] em-
ployment opportunities, and improve[d] social and economic well-being" for the Indian peoples
remain unrealized. Id. § 3701(4). Likewise, the BIA's limited regulatory jurisdiction over Indian
grazing activities within Indian Country does not extend to fee patent lands. See 25 C.F.R. §
162.102(c) (2009).
96. INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUNDATION, COMMUNITY SURVEY; IMPORTANCE OF LAND AND
VALUE OF PROPERTY RIGHTs 5 (2003), available athttp:llwww.indianlandtenure.orgpublicationsl
survey-results.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'dsub nom. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d
1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
99. Keepseagle v. Venneman, No. Civ.A.9903119EGS1712, 2001 WL 34676944 (D.D.C. Dec.
12,2001).
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Pigford v. Glickman°°-a lawsuit that has striking legal and factual
similarities to the Keepseagle litigation-provides a potential model for
my proposed legislative settlement framework. The Pgford settlement
has potential application to the Keepseagle litigation given the Obama
Administration's recent pledge to settle that case on fair terms. 01
Given the striking factual and legal similarities between the two law-
suits, similarities that have been fully documented in recent U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) reports on this matter, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the settlement structure of the latter litigation
will be of a similar character and scope to that ordered by the Pigford
court. That settlement's goal was to enable many, if not most, of those
African-American farmers to re-organize their farming operations and
to continue to work their lands as successful minority farmers. Doubt-
less, one goal of the envisioned Keepseagle settlement would be to en-
able the Indian ranchers likewise to re-organize their ranching opera-
tions so that they could continue to work their lands on the northern
Great Plains.
Furthermore, the Pigford settlement model may have direct appli-
cation to the Keepseagle litigation given the substantial factual and legal
similarities between these two lawsuits. These similarities were ful-
somely acknowledged in the 2002 and 2008 reports by the GAO regard-
ing the USDA's continuing disregard of the Indian ranchers' complaints
regarding their discriminatory mistreatment at the hands of the local of-
ficial in the FSA.1
0 2
Here is a brief description of the factual and legal context of these
two Indian lawsuits against the federal government.
100. 185 F.R.D. 82, 86-90 (D.D.C. 1999). This case involved a class-action lawsuit brought by
African-American farmers who were also applicants for federal loans and other assistance under the
minority farmer assistance programs administered by the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA). Id at 86-87. These minority farmers sued the USDA alleging that it had systematically
discriminated against them by either denying or delaying their applications for benefit programs or
by mishandling their discrimination complaints. Id. at 89. The court granted the plaintiffs' request
for class-action certification on October 9, 1998. Id. at 90. The case was later settled by a court ap-
proved consent decree on February 19, 1999. Id. at 91. The settlement was, in part, directed at ena-
bling some of the injured minority farmers to reorganize their existing operations and, thus, continue
as farmers. Id.
Under the settlement's terms, each successful individual claimant could receive up to
$187,000 in money damages and related judicial relief. In addition to a cash award of $50,000, each
successful claimant was eligible to receive additional relief, including tax assistance, debt forgiveness.
foreclosure termination, technical assistance, and a one-time loan priority consideration. Id at 108-
09. Therefore, the court concluded that a successful claimant's total court ordered relief could
amount to $187,000. Id. at 109.
101. See Thomas, supra note 81.
102. See Management of Civil Rights Efforts Continues to Be Deficient Despite Years of A tten-
tion: Testimony Before the H, Subcomm. on Government Management, Organization, and Procure-
ment Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2-3 (2008) (statement of Lisa
Shames, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office); Hispanic
and Other Minority Farmers Would Benefit from Improvements in the Operations of the Civil
Rights Program: Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Department Operations, Oversight, Nutri-
tion, and Forestry, Comm. on Agriculture, 107th Cong. 6-8 (2002) (statement of Lawrence J.
Dyckman, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office).
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a. Cobell v. Salazar 03
The Obama Administration has recently proposed a $3.4 billion
settlement of all the plaintiffs' claims in Cobell.104 That proposal has
earmarked about $2 billion to fund a tribal land consolidation program
that will likely focus, in part, on the restoration of high-quality grazing
lands to tribal ownership on the northern Great Plains. Given that the
legislative details of this settlement remain to be defined, Indian rancher
and farmer advocates have an important opportunity to educate Con-
gress regarding potential funding priorities as they relate to the restora-
tion of an economically and socially viable Indian-ranching industry on
the northern Great Plains. The Obama Administration's proposal con-
templates a $3.4 billion settlement of all claims in this matter.0 5 Con-
gress has not approved the administration's proposed settlement. The
structure of this proposed settlement, particularly the $2 billion of fed-
eral settlement funds that have been potentially "earmarked" for tribal
land consolidation efforts, will be evaluated as a potential model for
helping salvage some of the existing American Indian-ranching opera-
tions on the northern Great Plains.10 6
b. Keepseagle v. Venneman
The Obama Administration has likewise recently pledged to settle
the Keepseagle lawsuit on fair terms. 107  The Indian plaintiffs alleged
that they had lost over $450 million in potential income over the past
thirty years due to their discriminatory treatment by the federal gov-
ernment in the granting of agricultural loans and credit to that plaintiff
class.108 Recently, USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack told Indian ranchers
103. The Cobelllitigation has been ongoing since its filing in 1996, and in each round the secre-
tary of the interior is the named defendant. The current secretary of the interior is Ken Salazar.
104. Posting of Ojibwa to Native American Netroots, http://www.nativeamericannetroots.net/
diary/306/breaking-news-cobell-v-salazar-settled (Dec. 8, 2009, 9:44 PST); see also 91 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 1999). This case, filed in 1996, is an on-going class-action lawsuit brought on behalf of
American Indian trust beneficiaries of the federally administered Indian trust accounts known as
Individual Indian Monies (IIM) accounts Id. at 6-7. Most of these Indian plaintiffs own individual
Indian allotments that are held in trust for them by the United States. Id. Any income derived from
such allotments is deposited into the individual Indian's IIM account that is administered by the fed-
eral government on the Indian's behalf. Id at 9-12. The plaintiffs allege that the federal government
had mismanaged at least 35 million IIM accounts. Id. at 50-51. In 1999, the court found that the
federal government had breached the fiduciary duties it owed to the plaintiffs. Id at 7.
105. See Q & As, supra note 91.
106. Id
107. See Thomas, supra note 81. This on-going class-action lawsuit was brought by American
Indian ranchers and farmers who had applied for USDA-administered agricultural loans and other
USDA-administered farm credit or technical assistance programs. Keepseagle v. Venneman, No.
Civ.A.9903119EGS1712, 2001 WL 34676944, *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2001). These Indian plaintiffs also
alleged that the USDA systematically discriminated against them in the processing of their farm
credit applications and did not adequately investigate their discrimination complaints. Id The court
granted the plaintiffs' request for class certification in 2001. Id. at *15.
108. See Thomas, supra note 81.
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and farmers that he was "committed to resolving" this lawsuit.' 09 He
also told the Indians at this meeting that the department has had "litiga-
tion going on for a considerable period of time involving farmers, and
we're committed to resolving this."' 10
Secretary Vilsack may have been referring to the USDA's 1999 set-
tlement with African-American farmers of the Pigford lawsuit in which
the federal government has paid out $980 million even though it contin-
ued to fight the Indian ranchers' similar lawsuit. 1 ' Similar to Pgford's
settlement, the Indian ranchers and farmers are seeking adequate
money damages, as well as significant modifications as to how the
USDA administers its Indian-oriented farm credit programs.
Given that the details of the Obama Administration's proposed set-
tlement of the Cobell and Keepseagle lawsuits have not been finalized,
it is an opportune time for the Indian-ranching and farming advocates to
present their views as to how these two proposed settlements could be
effectively integrated to promote the restoration of Indian ranching on
the northern Great Plains.
The Pigford settlement model has potential application to the
Obama Administration's proposed settlement of the Keepseagle litiga-
tion. The substantial factual and legal similarities between these two
lawsuits were fulsomely cited in the 2002 and 2008 reports1 2 by the
GAO regarding the USDA's continuing disregard of the Indian ranch-
ers' complaints about their discriminatory mistreatment at the hands of
the local officials in the FSA. Indeed, an earlier 1997 official civil rights
report on the plight of minority farmers and ranchers cited similar con-
cerns regarding the USDA's treatment of those complainants:
The minority or limited-resource farmer tries to apply for a farm oper-
ating loan through the FSA county office well in advance of planting sea-
son. The FSA county office might claim to have no applications available
and ask the farmer to return later. Upon returning, the farmer might re-
ceive an application without any assistance in completing it, then be asked
repeatedly to correct mistakes or complete oversights in the loan applica-
tion. Often those requests for correcting the application could be
stretched for months, since they would come only if the minority farmer
contacted the office to check on the loan processing. By the time process-
ing is completed, even when the loan is approved, planting season has al-
ready passed and the farmer either has not been able to plant at all, or has
obtained limited credit on the strength of an expected FSA loan to plant a
small crop, usually without the fertilizer and other supplies necessary for
the best yields. The farmer's profit is then reduced.'
1 3
That report also cited the "real world" financial impact of the FSA's al-
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See Management of Civil Rights Efforts, supra note 102; Hispanic and Other Minority
Farmers, supra note 102.
113. CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION TEAM, CIVIL RIGHTS ATTHE U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. 15 (1997).
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leged discrimination upon the minority farmer:
If the farmer's promised FSA loan finally does arrive, it may have been
arbitrarily reduced, leaving the farmer without enough money to repay
suppliers and any mortgage or equipment debts. In some cases, the FSA
loan never arrives, again leaving the farmer without means to repay debts.
Further operating and disaster loans may be denied because of the
farmer's debt load, making it impossible for the farmer to earn any money
from the farm.... As an alternative, the local FSA official might offer the
farmer an opportunity to lease back the land with an option to buy it back
later. The appraised value of that land is set very high, presumably to
support the needed operating loans, but also making repurchase of the
land beyond the limited-resource farmer's means. The land is lost finally
and sold at auction, where it is bought by someone else at half the price
being asked of the minority farmer. Often it is alleged that the person was
a friend or relative of one of the FSA county officials.
114
III. CONCLUSION
Indian ranching may yet prove to be the only Indian-civilizing
strategy that worked. Whether that, in fact, proves to be the case will
depend on how successfully the federal government, in conjunction with
the relevant Indian leadership, settles the two above-cited Indian law-
suits. It is my belief that only through the successful settlement of those
two lawsuits will adequate congressional attention and funding become
available for the restoration of Indian ranching on the northern Great
Plains.
114. Id. at 16.
[Vol. 49
HeinOnline  -- 49 Washburn L.J. 780 2009-2010
